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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM 
Jan. 7, 1983 Conference 
List 5, Sheet 1 
No. 82-618 
KOSAK (tort pl.) 
v. 
UNITED STATES 
Cert to CA3 (Aldisert, Becker: 
Weis, diss.) 
Federal/Civil Timely 
SUMMARY: Petr contends that a provision of the Federal Tort 
Claims Act barring claims "in respect of ••• the detention of any 
goods ••• by any officer of customs" does not preclude a claim 
against the u.s. for negligent and careless damage to property 
while in the custody of the Customs Service. 
FACTS AND HOLDING BELOW: In 1978, Customs agents seized 
certain antiques and objects art from petr's home. He was · 




later charged with smuggling goods into the u.s. in violation of 
18 U.S.C. §545, based on the charge that he had entered the goods 
on a customs declaration as being for his own art collection, 
rather than resale. He was acquitted. The goods were returned 
to petr, but he contended that certain items had been damaged as 
a result of Customs Service negligence during their detention. 
He brought an action in DC (ED Pa, Hannum), seeking $12,310 in 
damages. 
The DC dismissed. Although the order does not set forth the 
reason for dismissal, the DC apparently accepted the Government's 
argument that the action was precluded by a section of the 
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 u.s.c. §2680(c), which 
provides that tort immunity remains in effect for "[a]ny claim 
arising in respect of ••• the detention of any goods or 
merchandise by any officer of customs." 
The CA3 affirmed, in a divided opinion. Judge Aldisert, for 
the majority, acknowedged that courts are divided in their 
interpretation of the section. In 1958, the CA2 held that 
§2680(c) applies only to claims based on injury caused by the 
detention itself, and not to losses caused by Customs Service 
negligent handling of goods during detention, Alliance Assurnce 
Co. v. United States, 252 F.2d 529 (CA2 1958). This approach was 
followed by A-Mark Inc. v. United States Secret Service, 593 F.2d 
849 (CA9 1978), and discussed with approval in A & D 
International, Inc. v. United States, 665 F.2d 669 (CAS 1982). 
Other courts have interpreted S2680(c) more broadly, see United 
States v. One (1) Douglas A-26B Aircraft, 662 F.2d 1372 (CAll 
( 
1981)7 United States v. One {1) 1972 Wood, 19 Foot Custom Boat, 
501 F.2d _1327, 1330 (CAS 1974). The Supreme Court recognized 
this split in Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, 444 u.s. 460 
(1980), but did not express any view on which interpretation was 
correct. 
The majority opted for the latter approach. That 
interpretation is in keeping with the clear language of the 
statute1 the legislative history, which indicates no intention 
contrary to the clear language of the statute: the purposes of 
the statutory scheme: and the conclusion of this Court that 
"clear relinquishment of sovereign immunity" is needed before an 
exception will be made to the language of the FTCA, Dalehite v. 
United States, 346 U.S. 15, 31 (1953). 
Judge Weis, dissenting, contended that the holding of the 
majority would produce anomalous results, in which negligent 
damage to a person's property during customs inspection would be 
actionable, but the same damage during a period of detention of 
the goods would not. The dissent quoted other language from 
Dalehite, supra, calling for strict interpretation of the 
exceptions to the FTCA. Here, the conduct is within the outer 
limits of the FTCA, so the exception in §2680(c) must be 
carefully examined. That subsection refers to a claim "arising 
in respect of" the detention of goods, not a claim "arising out 
of" such detention. That distinction is important. "The United 
States had a legal right to detain the ••• property without 





possession. However, the government is not immune from liability 
for the harm it did to the property while it was being detained." 
CONTENTIONS: Petr--The split in the circuits warrants 
review. In Hatzlachh, the Court referred to the existence of 
other remedies1 yet in this case no other remedy exists, and a 
property-owner would have no recourse even if the Customs Service 
deliberately destroyed his property while it was being detained. 
For the reasons set forth by the dissent and the conflicting 
opinions, the majority was wrong. 
Resp (SG)--The majority was correct1 the plain meaning of 
the statute compels the result below. In any event, the action 
is not worthy of review. Although there is a conflict, the issue 
arises only sporadically. (Because of the insignificance of the 
issue, the SG declined to seek review in the CA9 case reaching 
the opposite result.) Moreover, alternative remedies exist. 
Petr could bring an action against the customs collector 
personally, and might be able to bring an action for breach of 
contract. 
DISCUSSION: I recommend denial. There is a clear conflict1 
and neither interpretation of the statute seems correct beyond 
all doubt. Furthermore, the alternative remedies strike me as 
largely inadequate--lack of evidence would likely render very 
difficult a direct action against the customs collector v 
personally, and the SG notes that it is highly uncertain whether 
a breach of contract remedy is available. Nevertheless, the SG -







not believe that this conflict is important enough to warrant 
review. 
There is a response. 
December 18, 1982 Foote Ops in petn 
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Court ...........••....... l-•oted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . 
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KOSAK V. UNITED STATES 
Robert M. Couch 
Argument scheduled for Monday, November 7, 1983. 
Question Presented 
October 20, 1983 
Whether the Federal Tort Claims Act precludes a claim against 
the United States for negligent damage to property siezed by the 
Customs Service. 
• I, 
Outline of Memorandum Page 
I. BACKGROUND 3 
A. Statutes 3 
B. Facts 3 
c. Decisions Below 4 
II. DISCUSSION 5 
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The two provisions of the Federal Tort Claims Act that are 
relevant to this case are 28 u.s.c. §§1346(b) and 2680. Section 
1346 provides: 
" [T] he district courts. • . shall have exclusive juris-
diction of civil actions on claims against the United 
States, for money damages... for injury or loss of 
property, or personal injury or death caused by the 
negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee 
of the Government while acting within the scop€ of his 
office or ern lo ent, , unaer circumstances where the 
United States, if a pr0vate person, would be liable to 
the claimant in accordance with the law of the place 
where the act or omission occurred." 
Section 2680 provides: 
"The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of 
this title shall not apply to ... --
(b) Any claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, 
or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter. 
(c) Any claim arising in respect of the assessment or\ 
collec£lon ~any tax or customs duty, or thekdetention' 
of an oods or merchandise b an officer of customs 
or excise or any other law-enforcement o ficer." 
B. Facts 
When petr returned from a naval assignment in Guam, he sent 
back to the United States a number of pieces of oriental art. 
The Customs Service, suspecting that he had brought the i terns 
into the United States for resale, obtained a search warrant and 
seized the i terns. After a jury trial, petr was acquitted of 
smuggling. He then asked the Customs Service to return his art 
objects. When the Customs service finally got around to return-
ing petr's belongings, petr discovered that some of the items had 
b~d. 
c. Decisions Below 
Petr filed suit in federal district court seeking over 
$12,000 from the federal government because of the damage to his 
belongings. The Government moved to dismiss the complaint on the 
ground that the Federal Tort Claims Act does not allow a suit 
against the Government for damage to property detained by the 
v'"" 
Customs Service. The DC granted the motion. 
The ~3 affirmed. The CA3 looked to the plain language of 
§2680(c) as supporting the DC's decision. That section states 
that a party cannot sue the Government for "[a]ny claim arising 
in respect of •.. the detention of any goods or merchandise by 
any officer of customs .••• " The CA3 noted that nothing in the 
language of the statute or its legislative history indicates that 
Congress meant to allow a suit against the government where a 
customs official has been negligent. The CA3 refused to infer 
/
such a rule because of this Court's admonition that courts should 
find a waiver of sovereign immunity only where congressional in-
tent is clear. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 u.s. 15, 31 
(1953). The CA3 recognized that its decision conflicts with the 
CA2's holding in Alliance Assurance Co. v. United States, 252 
~ 
•. 
F.2d 529 (1958). In Alliance, the CA2 concluded that the proba-
IL u 
ble ~~=e of §2680 (c) was to prohibit actions for conversion ---------------- ~ 
arising from a denial by the customs authorities of another's 
immediate right of use of the siezed property. Therefore, Con-
gress did not intend to bar actions based on the negligent injury 
of goods in the possession or control of the customs authorities. 
The CA3 found the CA2's reasoning unpersuasive. 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. Petitioner's Contentions 
Petr contends that the plain language of §2680 (c) indicates 
that it was intended only to apply to damages to property result--It \ 
ing from the retention of the property. Petr supports his posi-
tion by referring to the legislative history and policies behind 
the exceptions contained in §2680. Petr also notes that when 
Congress wanted to exempt certain negligent acts by the postal 
service, it did so expressly. By failing to mention negligence 
in §2680, Congress revealed its desire to allow such actions 
against the Government. Petr also argues that dismissal was im-
proper as to two damaged or missing items even if §2680 (c) is 
given a broad interpretation, because these items were not "de-





The SG also relies on the plain language and legislative his-
tory of the statute. The SG contends that, by using the terms 
"any claim" and "in respect of," Congress expressed the intention -
that §2680(c) receive the broadest possible interpretation. Such 
an interpretation is consistent with the ~licies] behind 
§2680 (c). First, the customs service is a core activity of the 
Government which should be protected in order to operate effi-
ciently. Second, it would be difficult for the Customs Service 
to defend against suits of this nature. Third, the potential for 
fraudule~t ~uits is great. Finally, plaintiffs have another ave-
, .. ~ ~ ....... ~::w.::.---
nue of relief--negligence actions against individual customs in-
spectors. The SG sees no merit to petr's argument that the mo-
tion to dismiss should not have applied to two items. The SG 
submits that petr did not raise this issue in the courts below. 
c. Analysis 
As mentioned above both parties rely on the plain meaning and 
legislative history of §2680. The parties' disagreement regard-
ing the meaning of the words used in the statute stems from the 
emphasis petr puts on the word "detention" and the emphasis that 
the SG puts on the term "any claim arising in respect of." The 
statute is slightly ambiguous, but, taking the language as a 
whole, I think the SG's interpretation is correct. The phrase U:r 
~
"any claims in respect of •.. the detention of goods or merchan-
~· .... ~ 
... 
dise" connotes to me that Congress intended to be all-inclusive. 
Such a reading of §2680 (c) would also comport with the general 
rule of statutory construction that waivers of sovereign immunity 
should be narrowly construed. Dalehite v. United States, 346 
u.s. 15, 31 (1953). 
The parties apparently agree that what little legislative 
history there is indicates that the reference to customs offi-
cials in §2680(c) was included in that provision is that Congress 
thought that those parties aggrieved by the acts of customs offi-
cials had alternative avenues of recovery. See Hatzlachh Supply 
Co. v. United States, 444 u.s. 460, 463 n.4 (1980). Unfortunate-
ly, the parties cannot agree on whether the alternative remedies 
relied on in 1940 still exists. Petr states that there are "no 
particular statutory procedures for the recovery of damages for 
loss or damage to goods while in the custody of Customs 
officers." The SG cites to several cases that have held that a 
customs collector is a "quasi-bailee" of seized goods and can be 
held personally liable for negligence, citing United States v. 
Thomas, 82 u.s. (15 Wall.) 337, 342-343 (1873); States Marine 
Lines, Inc. v. Schultz, 498 F.2d 1146, 1149 (1974). Although the 
cases seems to bear out the SG's position, I do not think the 
legislative history of §2680 (c) is substantial enough to govern 
the outcome of this case. Both parties base their interpreta-
tions of the legislative history on the testimony of one witness 






Footnote(s) 1 will appear on following pages • 
. ' 
Even if the alternative avenues of relief envisionsed by Congress 
in 1940 no longer existed, the testimony of a single witness 
should not dictate an interpretation of §2680 that contradicts 
the plain language of that statute. 
Petr is not alone in his interpretation of §2680 (c). At 
least t! o circuits~a~ead §2680(c) as only applying to a~tions 
for conversion arising from the denial of the use of property ----
following a wrongful seizure. See A-Mark, Inc. v. United States ~ 
Secret Service, 593 F.2d 849, 850 (1978); Alliance Assurance Co. C:/{s? 
v. United States, 252 F.2d 529, 534 (1958). The only evidence 
of congressional intent cited by these courts is the juxtaposi-
tion of §2680(c) and §2680(b). Section 2680(b) bars suits "aris-
ing out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission" of 
mail. The A-Mark and Alliance courts reasoned that Congress's 
reference to negligence in §2680(b) indicates that it would have 
used like language in §2680(c) if it had intended for that sec-
tion to bar actions for the negligent handling of seized goods. 
I agree with the SG that a better explanation for Congress's 
decision to use narrower language in §2680(b) than that used in 
§2680 (c) is that Congress did not want to bar all suits related 
to the transmission of mail. For instance, Congress did not want 
to bar suits arising out of automobile accidents involving negli-
gent postal employees. As written, §2680(b) focuses on lost and 
1The SG also cites a report authored by the witness (the 
Holtzoff Report), but concedes that there is no evidence that the 
report was ever submitted to Congress. 
damaged letters and packages. Thus, the narrow scope of §2680(b) 
does not suggest that Congress intended §2680(c) to have a narrow 
scope as well. In fact, Congress's use of narrower language when 
it served a legislative purpose suggests that Congress would have 
expressly limited the application of §2680(c) if that's what Con-
gress had had in mind. 
The SG also discusses several policy reasons for barring 
suits against the Government in this sort of situation. In par-
ticular, the SG points to the difficulty of defending such suits 
and the potential for fraud. These arguments apply equally to 
any number of areas in which the Government has waived its sover-
eign immunity. 
wise in waiving 
choice. 
The important question is not whether Congress is 
immunity, but whether Congress has made that 
Perhaps the strongest argument the petr can make is a general 
fairness argument. In most situations, if a government employee 
is responsible for the negligent destruction of a civilian's 
property, the Government can be held responsible. In this case, 
petr cannot sue the government. Furthermore, filing suit against 
the negligent employee would be fairly impracticable. Petr would 
have difficulty establishing a chain of custody and specific evi-
dence of negligent activities would be hard to come by. Even if 
you accept these dire consequences as true, the balancing of the 
equities against the Government's interest in staying out of such 
suits is the business of Congress, rather than the courts. In 
the absence of any concrete evidence that Congress wanted to 
allow suits of this nature, I think the plain language of the 
statute indicates that Congress wanted to preserve the Govern-
ment's traditional immunity from suit. 
Petr's contentions regarding the applicability of §2680(c) to 
two minor items seized by the Customs Service is barely worthy of 
mention. Petr did not raise these issues in the lower cours and 
I doubt that the Court granted cert to consider these fact-bound 
and unimportant questions. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The result reached by the CA3, although somewhat harsh in 
appearance, seems correct. The plain meaning of the statute bars 
petr's suit against the Government. A change in this result must 
await action by Congress. 
~ . 
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From: Justice Marshall 
JA 2 4 1984 Circulated: _________ _ 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 82-618 
JOSEPH A. KOSAK, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
[January-, 1984] 
JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question presented in this case is whether 28 U. S. C. 
§ 2680(c), which exempts from the coverage of the Federal 
Tort Claims Act "[a]ny claim arising in respect of ... the~ 
tention of any goods or mechandise by an officer of cus-
toms," precludes recovery against the United tates for in-
jury to private property sustained during a temporary 
detention of the property by the Customs Service. 
I 
While a serviceman stationed in Guam, petitioner assem-
bled a large collection of oriental art. When he was trans-
ferred from Guam to Philadelphia, petitioner brought his art 
collection with him. In his customs declaration, 1 petitioner 
stated that he intended to keep the contents of the collection 
for himself. Subsequently, acting upon information that, 
contrary to his representations, petitioner planned to resell 
portions of his collection, agents of the United States Cus-
toms Service obtained a valid warrant to search petitioner's 
house. In executmg that warrant, the agents seized various 
antiques and other objects of art. 
Petr was charged with smuggling his art collection into the 
country, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 545. After a jury trial, 
' Because Guam is outside the customs territory of the United States, all 
goods imported therefrom are subject to duties. 19 U. S. C. § 1202. 
~
I /:2. S' 
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he was acquitted. The Customs Service then notified peti-
tioner that the seized objects were subject to civil forfeiture 
under 19 U. S. C. § 1592 (1976),~itted 
confiscation of goods brought into the United States "by 
means of any false statement." Relying on 19 U. S. C. 
§ 1618, petitioner filed a petition for relief from the forfei-
ture. 2 The Customs Service granted the petition and re-
turned the goods. 
Alleging that some of the objects returned to him had been 
~~~d while in the custody of the Customs Service, peti~ 
tioner filed an administrative complaint with the Service re-
questmg compe sation e a ge. The Customs Serv-
ice denied relief. Relying on the Federal Tort Claims Act, 
28 U. S. C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680, petitioner then filed suit in 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, seeking approximately $12,000 in damages for 
the alleged injury to his property. 3 The Government moved 
for a dismissal of the complaint or for summary judgment on 
the ground that petitioner's claim was barred by § 2680(c). 
The District Court granted the Government's motion. 4 
2 Section 1618 permits the Secretary of the Treasury to remit or miti-
gate a forfeiture "if he finds that such ... forfeiture was incurred without 
willful negligence or without any intention on the part of the petitioner to 
defraud the revenue or to violate the law, or finds the existence of such 
mitigating circumstances as to justify the remission or mitigation of such 
... forfeiture .... " 
3 Petitioner also requested damages for two other alleged injuries re-
lated to the seizure and detention of his property: the destruction of a cork 
pagoda by customs officials during the search of petitioner's house, and the 
accidental seizure of a sales receipt for a stereo receiver (without which pe-
titioner was unable to obtain warranty repairs). App. at 6-7. In his 
brief, petitioner argues that these two claims are segregable from his pri-
mary claim for damages resulting from the injury to the detained goods and 
merit separate analysis. Because petitioner did not present this argument 
to the Court of Appeals, we decline to consider it. See Neely v. Martin K. 
Eby Constr. Co., 386 U. S. 317, 330 (1967). 
'Civil Action No. 81-2054 (ED Pa. Oct. 15, 1981). The District Court 
did not identify the grounds for its ruling. We see no reason to doubt the 
( t 
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The Court of Appeals, with one judge dissenting, affirmed. 
679 F. 2d 306 (CA3 1982). The Court of Appeals reasoned C ft- '3 
that the United States may be hel liab e for torts committed 
by its emp oyees n on t e basis of a sta utory provision 
evincmg a 'c ear relin uishment of sovereign immunity." 
ld., at 309. In the court's v1ew, e e era ort Claims 
Act, as qualified by § 2680(c), fails to provide the necessary 
relinquishment of Governmental immunity from suits alleg-
ing that customs officials damaged or lost detained property. 
On the contrary, the court observed, the "clear language" of 
§ 2680(c) shields the United States from "all claims arising out 
of detention of goods by customs officers and does not pur-
port to distinguish among types of harm." I d., at 308. On 
that basis, the Court of Appeals held that petitioner had 
failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. 
We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict in the circuits 
regarding the liability of the United States for injuries 
caused by the negligence of customs officials in handling 




The Federal Tort Claims Act, enacted in 1946, provides 
generally that the United States shall be liable, to the same 
inference drawn by the Court of Appeals that the District Court was per-
suaded by the Government's argument that§ 2680(c) barred the suit. 679 
F. 2d 306, 307 and n. 2. It would have been better practice, however, for 
the District Court to have noted the reasons for its judgment. 
5 In three cases, Courts of Appeals have construed § 2680(c) in ways 
that would not bar petitioner's suit. A & D International, Inc. v. United 
States, 665 F. 2d 669 (CA5 1982); A-Mark, Inc. v. United States Secret 
Service, 593 F. 2d 849 (CA9 1978); Alliance Assurance Co. v. United 
States, 252 F. 2d 529 (CA2 1958). In two other cases, Courts of Appeals 
have read the provision as did the Third Circuit in this case. United 
States v. One (1) Douglas A-26B Aircraft, 662 F. 2d 1372 (CAll 1981); 
United States v. One (1) 1972 Wood, 19 Foot Custom Boat, 501 F. 2d 1327 
(CA5 1974). In Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, 444 U. S. 460, 462 
82-618-0PINION 
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extent as a private party, "for injury or loss of property, or 
personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful 
act or omission of any employee of the Government while act-
ing within the scope of his office or employment." 28 
U. S. C. § 1346(b); see also 28 U. S. C. § 2674. The Act's 
broad waiver of sovereign immunity is, however, subject to 
13 enumerated exceptions. 28 U. S. C. § 2680(a}-(n). One 
of those exceptions, § 2680(c), exempts from the coverage of 
the statute "[a]ny claim arising in respect of ... the deten-
tion of any goods or mechandise by any officer of cus-
toms .... " 6 Petitioner asks us to construe the foregoing 
language to cover only claims "for damage caused by the de-
tention itself and not for the negligent . . . destruction of 
property while it is in the possession of the customs service." 
By "damage caused by the detention itself," petitioner ap-
pears to mean harms attributable to an illegal detention, such 
as a decline in the economic value of detained goods (either 
because of depreciation or because of a drop in the price the 
goods will fetch), injury resulting from deprivation of the 
ability to make use of the goods during the period of deten-
tion, or consequential damages resulting from lack of access 
to the goods. 7 The Government asks us to read the excep-
n. 3 (1980), we acknowledged the divergence in the views of the circuits but 
expressly declined to decide the issue. 
6 The full text of § 2680(c) provides: 
"The provisions of [28 U. S. C. §§ 2671-2680] and of§ 1346(b) shall not 
apply to-
(c) Any claim arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax 
or customs duty, or the detention of any goods or merchandise by any offi-
cer of customs or excise or any other law-enforcement officer." 
We have no occasion in this case to decide what kinds of "law-enforce-
ment officer[s]," other than customs officials, are covered by the exception. 
7 In view of the fact that the Tort Claims Act permits recovery only of 
"money damages ... for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or 
death," 28 U. S. C. § 1346(b), it is unclear whether, even in the absence of 
§ 2680(c), any of the foregoing sorts of damage would be recoverable under 
the Act. Cf., e. g., Idaho ex rel. Trombley v. United States Department 
82-629---0PINION 
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tion to cover all injuries to property sustained during its de-
tention by customs officials. 8 
The starting point of our analysis of these competing inter-
pretations must of course be the language of § 2680(c). 
"[W]e assume 'that the legislative purpose is ex ressed by 
the or mary mearung o t e words used."' American To-
bacco Co. v. "Pafterson, <156 0. S. '03, 68 (1982)(quoting Rich-
ards v. United States, 369 U. S. 1, 9 (1962)). 9 At first blush, 
of the Army, 666 F. 2d 444 (CA9 1982), cert. denied, -U.S. -
(1982); County of San Diego v. Castillo, 665 F. 2d 1051 (CA9 1981), cert. 
denied, 455 U. S. 1018 (1982) (both cases adopting restrictive interpreta-
tions of the language of § 1346(b)). If the sorts of damages that, under 
petitioner's theory, are covered by § 2680(c) would not be recoverable in 
any event because of the limitation built into § 1346(b), § 2680(c) would be 
mere surplusage. The unattractiveness of such a construction of the stat-
ute, see Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U. S. 379, 392 (1979), would cast consid-
erable doubt on petitioner's position. However, because the question of 
the scope of § 1346(b) has not been briefed or argued in this case, we de-
cline to rely on any inferences that might be drawn therefrom in our deci-
sion today. 
8 Because petitioner conceded below that the injuries to his property oc-
curred after it had been lawfully detained by customs officers, we need not 
consider the meaning of the term "detention" as used in the statute. 
9 The Court of Appeals, while properly emphasizing the plain language 
of § 2680(c) as the basis for its ruling, suggested that the structure of the 
Tort Claims Act should affect how that language is read. Relying on the 
principles that "sovereign immunity is the rule, and that legislative depar-
tures from the rule should be strictly construed," the Court of Appeals sug-
gested that§ 2680(c), as an exception from a statute waiving sovereign im-
munity, should be broadly construed. 679 F. 2d, at 308-09. We find such 
an approach unhelpful. Though the Court of Appeals is certainly correct 
that the exceptions to the Tort Claims Act should not be read in a way that 
would "nullifly them] through judicial interpretation," id., at 309, unduly 
generous interpretations of the exceptions run the risk of defeating the 
central purpose of the statute. See United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 
U. S. 543, 548 n. 5 (1951); cf. Block v. Neal, - U. S. -, - (1983) 
("'The exemption of the sovereign from suit involves hardship enough 
where consent has been withheld. We are not to add to its rigor by refine-
ment of construction where consent has been announced.'") (quoting An-
derson v. Hayes Constr. Co., 243 N. Y. 140, 147, 153 N. E. 28, 29-30 
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the statutory language certainly appears expansive enough 
to support the Government's construction; the encompassing 
phrase, "arising in respect to," seems to sweep within the ex-
ception all injuries associated in any way with the "detention" 
of goods. It must be admitted that this initial reading is not 
ineluctable; as Judge Weis, dissenting in the Court of Ap-
peals, pointed out, it is possible (with some effort) to read the 
phrase, "in respect of" as the equivalent of "as regards" and 
thereby to infer that "the statutory exception is directed to 
the fact of detention itself, and that alone." 679 F. 2d, at 
310. But we think that the fairest interpretation of the cru-
cial portion of the provision is the one that first springs to 
mind: "any claim arising in respect of" the detention of goods 
means any claim "arising out of" the detention of goods, and 
includes a claim resulting from negligent handling or storage 
of detained property. 
Relying on the analysis of the Second Circuit in Alliance 
Assurance Co. v. United States, 252 F. 2d 529 (1958), peti-
tioner argues that the foregoing reading of the plain language 
of§ 2680(c) is undercut by the context in which the provision 
appears. 
"That the exception does not and was not intended to bar 
actions based on the negligent destruction, injury or loss 
of goods in the possession or control of the customs au-
thorities is best illustrated by the fact that the exception 
immediately preceding it expressly bars actions 'arising 
out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission' of 
mail. 28 U.S. C. §2680(b). If Congress had similarly 
wished to bar actions based on the negligent loss of 
goods which governmental agencies other than the 
postal system undertook to handle, the exception in 28 
(1926) (Cardozo, J .)). We think that the proper objective of a court at-
tempting to construe one of the subsections of 28 U. S. C. § 2680 is to iden-
tify "those circumstances which are within the words and reason of the ex-
ception"-no less and no more. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U. S. 
15, 31 (1953). 
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U. S. C. § 2680(b) shows that it would have been equal to 
the task. The conclusion is inescapable that it did not 
choose to bestow upon all such agencies general absolu-
tion from carelessness in handling property belonging to 
others." I d., at 534. 10 
We find the conclusion reached by petitioner and the Sec-
ond Circuit far from "inescapable." The specificity of 
§ 2680(b), in contrast with the generality of § 2680(c), sug-
gests, if anything, that Congress intended the former to be 
less encompassing than the latter. The motivation for such 
an intent is not hard to find. One of the principal purposes of 
the Federal Tort Claims Act was to waive the Government's 
immunity from liability for injuries resulting from auto acci-
dents in which employees of the Postal System were at 
fault.u In order to ensure that § 2680(b), which governs 
torts committed by mailmen, did not have the effect of bar-
ring precisely the sort of suit that Congress was most con-
cerned to authorize, the draftsmen of the provision carefully 
delineated the types of misconduct for which the Government 
was not assuming financial responsibility-namely, "the loss, 
miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal 
matter"-thereby excluding, by implication, negligent han-
dling of motor vehicles. The absence of any analogous desire 
to limit the reach of the statutory exception pertaining to the 
detention of property by customs officials explains the lack of 
comparable nicety in the phraseology of§ 2680(c). 
B 
The legislative history of § 2680(c), though meager, sup-
ports the interpretation of the provision that we have derived 
1° For reiterations of this argument, see A & D International , Inc. v. 
United States , 665 F. 2d ," at 672; A-Mark, Inc . v. United States Secret 
Service, 593 F. 2d, at 850. 
11 See General Tort Bill: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House 
Comm. on Claims, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., 17 (1932) (testimony of Asst. Atty. 
Gen. Rugg). 
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from its language and context. Two specific aspects of the 
evolution of the provision are telling. First, the person who 
almost certainly drafted the language under consideration 
clearly thought that it covered injury to detained property 
caused by the negligence of customs officials. It appears 
that the portion of § 2680(c) pertaining to the detention of 
goods was first written by Jud~f, one of 
the major figures in the development of the Tort Claims Act. 
In his Report explicating his proposals, Judge Holtzoff 
explained: 
"[The proposed provision would exempt from the cover-
age of the Act] [c]laims arising in respect of the assess-
ment or collection of any tax or customs duty. This ex-
ception appears in all previous drafts. It is expanded, 
however, so as to include immunity from liability in re-
spect of loss in connection with the detention of goods or 
merchandise by any officer of customs or excise. The 
additional proviso has special reference to the detention 
of imported goods in appraisers' warehouses or customs 
houses, as well as seizures by law enforcement officials, 
internal revenue officers, and the like." A. Holtzoff, 
Report on Proposed Federal Tort Claims Bill 16 (1931) 
(Holtzoff Report) (emphasis added). 12 
Though it cannot be definitively established that Congress 
relied upon Judge Holtzoff's report, it is significant that the 
12 Judge Holtzoff went on to explain that "[t]his provision is suggested in 
the proposed draft of the bill submitted by the Crown Proceedings Com-
mittee in England in 1927 .... " Holtzoff Report at 16. The relevant 
portion of the bill to which Holtzoff referred was even more explicit: 
"No proceedings shall lie under this section-
(c) for or in respect of the loss of or any deterioration or damage occa-
sioned to, or any delay in the release of, any goods or merchandise by rea-
son of anything done or omitted to be done by any officer of customs and 
excise acting as such .... " Report of Crown Proceedings Comm. 
§ 11(5)(c), pp. 17-18 (April 1927). 
(It appears that this bill was never enacted into law in England.) 
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apparent draftsman of the crucial portion of§ 2680(c) believed 
that it would bar a suit of the sort brought by petitioner. 
Second, the Congressional committees that submitted re-
ports on the various bills that ultimately became the Tort 
Claims Act suggested that the provision that was to become 
§ 2680(c), like the other exceptions from the waiver of sover-
eign immunity, covered claims "arising out of" the designated 
conduct. Thus, for example, the House Judiciary Commit-
tee described the proposed exceptions as follows: 
"These exemptions cover claims arising out of the loss 
or miscarriage of postal matter; the assessment or collec-
tion of taxes or assessments; the detention of goods by 
customs officers; admiralty and maritime torts; delib-
erate torts such as assault and battery; and others." 
H. R. Rep. No. 1287, 79th Gong., 1st Sess., 6 (1945). 13 
The Com~ittees' casual us~f th~ w...Qrd~ J arising ou(3'," 
with reference to the exemption of claims pertaining to the 
@"ep!I§Jbf goods substantially undermines petitioner'Scon-
tentwn that the phrase, "in respect of," was designed to limit 
the sorts of suits covered by the provision. 14 
Of perhaps greater importance than these two clues as to 
the meaning of the prepositional phrase contained in § 2680(c) 
is the fact that our interpretation of the plain language of the 
provision accords with what we know of Congress' general 
purposes in creating exceptions to the Tort Claims Act. The 
three objectives most often mentioned in the legislative his-
tory as rationales for the enumerated exceptions are: ensur-
ing that "certain governmental activities" not be disrupted by 
"the threat of damage suits"; avoiding exposure of the United 
States to liability for excessive or fraudulent claims; and not 
13 See also S. Rep. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. , 33 (1946); S. Rep. No. 
1196, 77th Cong. , 2d Sess. , 7 (1942); H. R. Rep. No. 2245, 77th Cong., 2d 
Sess. , 10 (1942). 
1
' Cf. Kosak v. United States, 679 F . 2d, at 309 (Weis, J. , dissenting) 
(discussed, supra, at-). 
" 
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extending the coverage of the Act to suits "for which ade-
quate remedies are already available." 15 
The exemption of claims for damage to goods in the cus-
tody of customs officials is certainly consistent with the first 
two of these purposes. One of the most important sanctions I 
available to the Customs Service in ensuring compliance with 
the customs laws is its power to detain goods owned by sus-
pected violators of those laws. 16 Congress may well have 
wished not to dampen the enforcement efforts of the Service 
by exposing the Government to private damage suits by dis-
gruntled owners of detained property. 
Congress may also have been concerned that a waiver of 
immunity from suits alleging damage to detained property 
would expose the United States to liability for fraudulent 
claims. The Customs Service does not have the staff or re-
sources it would need to inspect goods at the time it seizes 
them. Lacking a record of the condition of a piece of prop-
15 For a variety of expressions of these three purposes, see S. Rep. No. 
1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 33 (1946); H. R. Rep. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st 
Sess., 6 (1945); Tort Claims: Hearings on H. R. 5373 and H. R. 6463 Before 
the House Judiciary Comm., 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 33 (1942) (testimony of 
Asst. Atty. Gen. Shea); Tort Claims Against the United States: Hearings 
on H. R. 7236 Before Subcomm. No. 1 of the House Judiciary Comm., 76th 
Cong., 3d Sess., 22 (1940) (testimony of Alexander Holtzoff); Hearings, 
supra note 11, at 17 (testimony of Asst. Atty. Gen. Rugg); Holtzoff Re-
port, at 15. To our knowledge, the only arguably relevant specific state-
ment as to the purpose of § 2680(c) appears in the testimony of Judge 
Holtzoff before a subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee. 
Holtzoff emphasized the adequacy of existing remedies as a justification for 
the portion of the provision pertaining to the recovery of improperly col-
lected taxes; he did not proffer an explanation for the portion of the provi-
sion pertaining to the detention of goods. Tort Claims Against the United 
States: Hearings on S. 2690 before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 38 (1940). 
16 See, e. g., 19 U. S. C. § 1594 (authorizing seizure of "a vessel or vehi-
cle" to force payment of assessed penalties); 19 U. S. C. § 1595a(a) (au-
thorizing seizure of property used to facilitate the illegal importation of 
other goods); 21 U. S. C. § 881(a)(1), (4) (authorizing seizure of controlled 
substances and conveyances used to transport them). 
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erty when the Service took custody of it, the Government 
would be in a poor position to defend a suit in which the 
owner alleged that the item was returned in damaged condi-
tion. 17 Congress may have reasoned that the frequency with 
which the Government would be obliged to pay undeserving 
claimants if it waived immunity from such suits offset the in-
equity, resulting from retention of immunity, to persons with 
legitimate grievances. 
To a lesser extent, our reading of § 2680(c) is consistent 
with the third articulated purpose of the exceptions to the 
Tort Claims Act. At common law, a property owner had 
(and retains) a right to bring suit against an individual cus-
toms official who negligently damaged his goods. 18 28 
U. S. C. § 2006 provides that judgments in such suits shall be 
paid out of the federal Treasury if a court certifies that there 
existed probable cause for the detention of the goods and that 
the official was acting under the directions of an appropriate 
supervisor. 19 Congress in 1946 may have concluded that this 
mode of obtaining recompense from the United States (or 
from an individual officer) was "adequate." To be sure, 
17 The Government's vulnerability to fraudulent claims would be espe-
cially great in a case in which the Customs Service took custody of the 
goods from a shipper rather than from the owner. The shipper would con-
tend that it exercised due care in the handling of the goods. The owner 
would demonstrate that he received the goods in damaged condition. In 
the absence of an extensive system for accounting for the movements and 
treatment of property in its custody, the Customs Service would be hard 
pressed to establish that its employees were not at fault. We do not sug-
gest that such a dilemma would automatically give rise to liability on the 
part of the United States; that of course would depend upon the substance 
of the pertinent state tort law. See 28 U. S. C.§§ 1346(b), 2674. But un-
easiness at the prospect of such scenarios may have influenced Congress 
when it carved out this exception to the Tort Claims Act. 
18 See, e. g., States Marine Lines, Inc. v. Schultz, 498 F. 2d 1146, 1149 
(CA4 1974); Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F. 2d 774, 775 (CA2 1944); J. 
Story, Commentaries on the Law of Bailments §§ 613, 618, at 387, 390 
(1832). 
19 See State Marine Lines, Inc. v. Schultz, supra, at 1149-1150. 
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there are significant limitations to the common-law remedy, 
the most important of which is the apparent requirement that 
the plaintiff prove negligence on the part of a particular cus-
toms official. 20 Such proof will often be difficult to come by. 
But Congress may well have concluded that exposing the 
United States to liability for injury to property in the custody 
of the Customs Service under circumstances in which the 
owner is not able to demonstrate such specific negligence 
would open the door to an excessive number of fraudulent 
suits. 21 
III 
Petitioner and some commentators argue that that 
§ 2680(c) should not be construed in a fashion that denies an 
effectual remedy to many persons whose property is dam-
aged through the tortious conduct of customs officials. 22 
That contention has force, but it is properly addressed to 
Congress, not to this Court. The language of the statute as 
20 At oral argument, the Government contended that a property owner 
could recover against the United States under this composite theory by 
bringing suit against the relevant District Director of the Customs Service 
and would not be obliged to prove negligence on the part of any specific 
customs official. Tr. of Oral Arg. 28-29. Though we do not decide the 
issue, such an interpetation of the common-law doctrine appears question-
able to us. Except in cases in which the property owner could demon-
strate that the Director expressly authorized tortious conduct by a subor-
dinate, it seems likely that the owner would be obliged to identify and 
bring suit against the individual whose malfeasance caused the injury to his 
goods. 
21 We note that there exists at least one other remedial system that 
might enable someone in petitioner's position to obtain compensation from 
the Government. If the owner of property detained by the Customs Serv-
ice were able to establish the existence of an implied-in-fact contract of 
bailment between himself and the Service, he could bring suit under the 
Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1491. See Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United 
States, 444 U. S. 460 (1980). 
22 Comment, Governmental Liability for Customs Officials' Negligence: 
Kosak v. United States, 67 Minn. L. Rev. 1040 (1983); Note, Using the 
Federal Tort Claims Act to Remedy Property Damage Following Customs 
Service Seizures,-- U. Mich. J . of L. Reform-- (1984). 
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it was written leaves us no choice but to affirm the judgment 
of the Court of Appeals that the Tort Claims Act does not 
cover suits alleging that customs officials injured property 
that had been detained by the Customs Service. 
It is so ordered. 
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